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DOES THE REASONABLE MAN HAVE OBSESSIVE
COMPULSIVE DISORDER?
Lucy Jewel*

The reasonable man is an anthropomorphic metaphor for
legal reasoning. In this role, he sometimes shows symptoms
of mental illness. He exhibits a compulsion to organize, rank,
and prevent disorder, a process that can create unjust
outcomes. When he is symptomatic, the reasonable man
becomes a monster borne out of a fear of disorder. As the
putative judge whom all lawyers write and speak in front of,
the reasonable man is the reader attorneys fine-tune their
arguments and language for.
After developing a case history for the reasonable man,
this Article engages with several questions. First, when
advocates emulate the reasonable man’s white, privileged,
patrimonial, and no-nonsense approach to legal reasoning,
are they nurturing a monster? Second, do advocates reinforce
inequality by adopting the reasonable man’s privileged
persona and formalist approach to legal reasoning? And
finally, if the reasonable man sometimes exhibits symptoms
of a mental disorder, can our law and culture heal him?
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is a thought experiment. Using the reasonable man
as an anthropomorphic metaphor for legal rhetoric and also the legal
system, my Article theorizes that the reasonable man sometimes
shows symptoms of mental illness. He sometimes exhibits a
compulsion to organize, rank, and prevent disorder, a process that can
create unjust outcomes. As a stand in for the legal system, the
reasonable man, when he is symptomatic, becomes a monster borne
out of a fear of disorder. If my hypothesis is correct, and the
reasonable man is prone to having thought disorders, what can be
done to heal him?
The reasonable person, or reasonable man, is the go-to construct
for evaluating whether legal conduct should create civil or criminal
liability.1 The reasonable man was conceived in Rome as the bonus
pater familias (good father of the family).2 Over the years, he began
to evolve within the Anglo-American common law process. In the
U.S., the reasonable man’s gestation period began in the colonial era,
where we find many nascent ideas for American legal mindset.3 The
reasonable man was further forged in Victorian culture as two
germinal British cases fleshed him out in the middle of the nineteenth
century.4 Then, in a series of lectures written in the 1880s, Justice

1. Francis H. Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 1225, 1225
(1937).
2. Id.; Wendy Parker, The Reasonable Person: A Gendered Concept?, 23
VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 105, 105 (1993).
3. See Bohlen, supra note 1, at 1225 (discussing the reasonable man as an
“accepted doctrine” in 1937).
4. Parker, supra note 2, at 105 (citing Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng.
Rep. 468, 3 Bing. N.C. 468 and Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., (1856) 156
Eng. Rep. 1047, 11 Exch. 781).
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Oliver Wendell Holmes gave the reasonable man his concretized U.S.
form.5
The reasonable man appears in a variety of legal contexts as a
tool to help a judge and jury evaluate the parties’ conduct.6 He is one
of American law’s sacred cows; he is not usually associated with
backward, authoritarian thinking (of the type discussed in this
Article). The reasonable man is viewed as a democratic and
liberalizing principle in the law, a construct that allows legal issues
to get beyond the purview of the judge and in front of the jury.7 The
reasonable man also gives legal process a localizing effect, allowing a
jury to evaluate conduct using local norms.8
This Article does not dispute the reasonable man’s positive
impact on American legal doctrine. Instead, I refer to the reasonable
man not as a construct for evaluating the legal bounds of an
individual’s conduct, but as a stand in, a golem of sorts, for American
law itself. The narrow focus of this Article is to look beyond the
specific doctrinal context and evaluate the reasonable man as a standin for legal reasoning.9 The reasonable man stands for reason itself
and for reason’s dominance over the American legal process, “both as
a descriptive model of human behavior and as a prescriptive norm for
legal rules and adjudicative outcomes.”10
The reasonable man is a construct residing in the psyche of all
judges and lawyers. I purposely refer to the reasonable man as a
man, not as a gender-neutral person. Despite the gender-neutral

5. See ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND
LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 112–22 (2000) (citing inter alia OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 93 (1881) (discussing the evolution of Holmes’s
objective prudent man standard and comparing it to the British conception of the
type featured in Vaughan, 132 Eng. at 468)).
6. The reasonable man appears in a wide variety of legal settings. See, e.g.,
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988) (Fourth Amendment probable
cause); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987) (obscenity); Allen v. U.S., 164
U.S. 492, 498 (1896) (self-defense/justifiable homicide); R.R. Co. v. Jones, 95 U.S.
439, 441–42 (1877) (negligence); EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d
991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010) (Title VII sexual harassment); List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965) (SEC insider trading).
7. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
77–78, 183 (2003) (noting that the evolution of the reasonableness standard in
tort law gave a greater role to juries although, ironically, Justice Holmes sought
to limit the role of the jury whenever possible).
8. See Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and the Reasonable Person, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1455, 1457–58 (2010).
9. I thought hard about changing the title to make it less provocative – one
of my commentators suggested Does the Legal Mind Have OCD? as a better title.
But that title fails to capture the core critical elements of my project. And, it is
much less catchy.
10. Anne C. Dailey, Striving for Rationality, 86 VA. L. REV. 349, 351 (2000)
(reviewing JONATHAN LEAR, OPEN MINDED: WORKING OUT THE LOGIC OF THE SOUL
(1998)).
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language, many of the reasonable person’s attributes remain male.11
In other words, having the reasonable man eventually become the
more universal reasonable person allows the law to embrace more
context and nuance, but much of the reasonable man’s DNA remains
male-centric, authoritarian, and rigid.12
These gendered
characteristics continue to influence the law. I am also using the term
reasonable with a specific goal, to interrogate the enlightenment
principles that have come to animate our legal culture.
The reasonable man is also the judge whom all lawyers write and
speak in front of. Regarding Aristotle’s three modes of rhetorical
persuasion—logos, pathos, and ethos—this Article focuses on all
three, but ethos is the predominant concept. Logos is the appeal to
legal rules and reasoning; pathos is an appeal to emotion; and ethos
is an appeal to the credibility of the speaker.13 The reasonable man
is the audience we are always fine-tuning our arguments and
language for. As law advocates, we seek to cultivate an authorial
voice, an ethos that mirrors the expectations of the putative judge
who is always evaluating our arguments.14 To expand upon the ideas
of Professor Andrea McArdle, understanding how the reasonable man
inhabits the mindset of a judge “offers a window onto [the judge’s]
own sense of audience, argument, and writerly perspective, and can
suggest strategies for the brief writer who must argue to that judge
in a rhetorically resonant way.”15 Professor Melissa Weresh refers to
this mirroring process as developing the “source relational attributes”
of ethos.16 Ethos is established by creating a relationship of trust and
credibility between the source (the author) and the reader.17
Mirroring creates an aura of attitudinal similarity between the
author and the reader, a similarity that is highly persuasive.18 This
Article argues that mirroring the reasonable man’s attitudes requires
advocates to adopt a judge-like, patrimonial, and authoritative tone.
11. See generally Ann McGinley, Reasonable Men?, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2012)
(discussing feminists’ objection to a reasonable person standard because in
reality, it was based on a reasonable man); Parker, supra note 2; Marto
Schlanger, Gender Matters: Teaching a Reasonable Woman Standard in Personal
Injury Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 769 (2001) (describing the reasonable man with
explicitly masculine phrases).
12. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 3, 23 (1988) (when the reasonable man was converted to the
reasonable person, it did not change the male-centric perspective).
13. KRISTEN KONRAD ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS 18
(2009).
14. See Andrea McArdle, Teaching Writing in Clinical, Lawyering, and Legal
Writing Courses: Negotiating Professional and Personal Voice, 12 CLINICAL L.
REV. 501, 509 (2006) (discussing the benefits of studying the authorial practices
of judges).
15. Id.
16. Melissa H. Weresh, Morality, Trust, and Illusion: Ethos as Relationship,
9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 229, 234 (2012).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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However, there are dark undercurrents to this tone, which are not
free from emotion.19
This Article puts the reasonable man’s ethos under a socialpsychological microscope.20 Describing how the reasonable man is
constituted sheds light on how the law operates. I am interested in
answers to the following questions: When we emulate the reasonable
man’s strict, patrimonial, no-nonsense approach to legal reasoning,
what kind of monster21 are we emulating?22 Are we reinforcing
inequality by adopting the reasonable man’s privileged persona and
formalist approach to legal reasoning? Finally, if the reasonable man
sometimes exhibits symptoms of a mental disorder, how can our law
and culture heal him?
The cases discussed in this Article—Scott v. Sandford,23 Plessy v.
Ferguson,24 Buck v. Bell,25 Michael H. v. Gerard D.,26 and Grand
Upright Music v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc.27—show a mode of legal
thinking that exhibits a slavish devotion to rigid thinking, clean
social/racial categories, and punitive outcomes. These cases illustrate
the toxic thought patterns that can sometimes produce and reproduce
injustice and inequality. These thought patterns are symptomatic of
mental illness in the reasonable man. One could say that these cases
are anti-canonical and thus not the best evidence for explaining
American common law process. While some of these cancerous cases
have been overturned, the style of thinking has not gone into
remission; it remains in place to this day.28
19. See Harold A. Lloyd, Cognitive Emotion and the Law, 41 LAW & PSYCHOL.
REV. 53, 55–57 (2017).
20. In drafting this Article, I’ve been inspired by two articles I read long ago,
both of which placed abstract law concepts under a psychological lens. See
generally Thomas F. Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself,
54 VA. L. REV. 637 (1968) (discussing the schizophrenic aspects of the law
professor’s dual role as intellectual and teacher of lawyering skills [“trainer of
Hessians”]); Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392
(1971) (discussing the psychological dimensions between the conflict between
social activist law students and the traditional goals of legal education).
21. Because of its behemoth complexity and many actors and parts, the legal
system can be categorized as a monster. See John Law, Introduction: Monsters,
Machines and Sociotechnical Relations, in 38 SPECIAL ISSUE: SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW MONOGRAPH SERIES: A SOCIOLOGY OF MONSTERS: ESSAYS ON POWER,
TECHNOLOGY, AND DOMINATION 18 (John Law ed., 1991).
22. See McArdle, supra note 14, at 513 (asking whether or not legal writers
should emulate the “assertive-bordering-on-combative tone” in Justice Scalia’s
writing).
23. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
24. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
25. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
26. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
27. 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
28. See A-B-, 27 I & N Dec. 316, 316, 319–320, 333–340 (A.G. 2018). In this
case (and accompanying administrative memorandum), then-Attorney General
Jeff Sessions raised an already high barrier for asylum claims by unilaterally
holding that Central American victims of domestic violence or gang violence
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The reasonable man’s tendency toward monstrosity causes harm
because his problematic thought patterns carry through to the legal
culture as a whole, creating injurious layers. As Professor Debra
Austin has lucidly pointed out, there are connections between our
combat-oriented legal culture and high rates of stress, anxiety,
substance abuse, and depression in law students and lawyers.29 At
the end of this Article, I argue that these toxic patterns could be
ameliorated through therapeutic intervention. Therapeutic justice,
alternative dispute resolution, and participatory defense movements
have brought us some of these approaches already.30 In addition to
these pre-existing approaches, other solutions could involve our legal
system becoming more open to contextual perspectives existing
outside of traditional views and learning from alternative, nonWestern modes of rhetoric and knowledge production. A comparative
approach (how do other cultures solve legal problems?) grounded in
the practice of active listening could improve some of the more toxic
aspects of our legal system. Administering therapy for legal
reasoning’s dysfunctions is also something we might teach.
As a foundation, Part II will explain that inquiring into the
reasonable man’s temperament is necessary because of the power his
voice holds. Part III develops the golem metaphor for the reasonable
man—the reasonable man is an anthropomorphic creature that
stands for our complex legal system. Part IV briefly summarizes the
reasonable man’s personality attributes. Part V summarizes several
judicial opinions that aptly illustrate the reasonable man’s
personality. Part VI analyzes the reasonable man’s personality
attributes and concludes that he might have a personality disorder.
And finally, Part VII discusses strategies for reshaping the
reasonable man’s mind for the better.
II. THE POWER OF THE REASONABLE MAN’S VOICE
What is the practical purpose of this thought experiment? A
thorough evaluation of the reasonable man is necessary because of

cannot, in general, establish a reasonable fear of prosecution. Because gang and
domestic violence stems from non-governmental action and it is not always true
that Central American countries are unwilling to prosecute domestic and gang
violence, the element of a reasonable fear of persecution will rarely be met by
these claimants. The reasoning in this case and memorandum ignores the reality
that these crimes are rarely prosecuted, if ever. It also shows how formalistic
and rigid legal reasoning can be used to keep the U.S. free and clear from
unwanted immigrant others.
29. Debra S. Austin, Positive Legal Education: Flourishing Law Students
and Thriving Law Schools, 77 MD. L. REV. 649, 649–50 (2018) [hereinafter
Austin, Positive Legal Education]; Debra S. Austin, Killing Them Softly:
Neuroscience Reveals How Brain Cells Die from Law School Stress and How
Neural Self-Hacking Can Optimize Cognitive Performance, 59 LOY. L. REV. 791,
793–98 (2013) [hereinafter Austin, Killing].
30. See infra notes 261–76 and surrounding text.
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the enormous power he wields in formulating legal rhetoric. As a
style of speech that lawyers seek to mirror and emulate, the
reasonable man’s voice is enormously potent. If the reasonable man
suffers from poor mental hygiene, then it is not good that he wields
so much power.
The reasonable man’s rhetoric is so powerful because the body
politic believes in it. The belief that our stand-in for the law, the
reasonable man, is rational, neutral, and free from emotion generates
collective buy-in for an impartial legal system. Here, however, the
reasonable man might be operating in denial of his emotions. The
reasonable man’s ethos is founded upon the fallacious belief that the
mind can be separated from the body.31 Although held out to be
rational, logical, and objective, legal reasoning is often imbued with
emotion.32
Despite the reality that reason is not free from emotion, collective
buy-in allows the system to work; people believe the language. Thus,
legal rhetoric has the power to literally construct reality.33 The power
to make reality resides in he/she who possesses the most juridical
power, the power, in the words of Captain Picard, to “make it so.”34
Because the law is imbued with the power of the state (i.e., the power
to punish and fine), legal words create concrete consequences in the
material world.35 For instance, when a judge pronounces that a
person is guilty, the judge’s words make that person’s guilt reality.
The reasonable man’s voice is also powerful because of its
embodied and iterative nature; the reasonable man tends to repeat
himself and get underneath our skin. Neuro-rhetoric holds that
rhetoric can become embodied—words and thought structures can
actually influence the pathways in our brains.36 This is in line with
the beliefs of the ancient Sophists, who understood rhetoric as having

31. Lucille A. Jewel, Old School Rhetoric and New School Cognitive Science:
The Enduring Power of Logocentric Categories, 13 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 39,
45 (2016) (citing GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH:
THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 4 (1999)).
32. Lloyd, supra note 19, at 58 (“We are not the rational beings we think we
are. . . . A large part of our frontal cortex is involved with emotion.”) (quoting
Caroline Maughn, Why Study Emotion?, in AFFECT AND LEGAL EDUCATION:
EMOTION IN LEARNING AND TEACHING THE LAW 13 (Paul Maharg & Caroline
Maughan eds., 2011)).
33. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical
Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 814, 827, 831 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987).
34. Id. at 827. On this point, Bourdieu is borrowing from Speech Act Theory,
a philosophical theory that engages with the power of words to make social
meanings. See Richard Terdiman, Translator’s Introduction: The Force of Law:
Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 809 (1987)
(citing J. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962) and J. SEARLE, SPEECH
ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969)).
35. See Terdiman, supra note 34, at 809.
36. Lucy Jewel, Neuro-Rhetoric, Race, and the Law: Toxic Neural Pathways
and Healing Alternatives, 76 MD. L. REV. 663, 669–71 (2017).
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the same kind of effect on the brain as a drug.37 Legal rhetoric’s
iterative nature (the common law repeats the same legal meanings
over and over again) creates pathways in our brains, individually and
collectively, which then become entrenched.38
In the United States, traditional legal rhetoric has been
dominated by a classical Western approach involving the use of rigid
categories, decontextualized syllogisms, unforgiving dichotomies, all
within a hyper-adversarial and hierarchical culture.39 These thought
processes are repeated over and over again, reinforcing the messages.
When these pathways are based on or reinforce hierarchical
stereotypes, toxic thought patterns are generated that can become
difficult to dislodge.40
Moreover, applying neuro-rhetoric to
traditional legal thought suggests that the hyper-competitive and
often toxic process by which law is made might actually be harming
the minds of lawyers, law students, and other stakeholders in the
system.
Finally, the reasonable man’s voice carries the power to create
exclusionary boundaries.
Due to the influence of Western
enlightenment principles, the reasonable man can become obsessed
with ranking and order, often to the detriment of equality and justice.
The history of common law legal process surfaces an enduring project
to impose hierarchical order and neatness on the messy bramblebush41 of human relations.42 Order, predictability, and certainty are
positive attributes of our legal system, but there is a cost. The
reasonable man’s obsession with hierarchical order has religious and
philosophical underpinnings and comes with a very dark side,
particularly when we see how legal categories can be used to
subordinate women and minorities. It is difficult to discuss logic,
rhetoric, and justice in the United States without stumbling upon
examples where logic has clashed with the rights and dignity of
minority others. Thus, large portions of this Article direct attention
to how the anthropomorphic reasonable man has limited the rights
and liberty of women and minorities.
III. THE REASONABLE MAN AS GOLEM
This is a rather strange metaphor to show up in a law review
article on cognitive rhetoric and emotion, but please bear with me; the
connection is fascinating.
Because the reasonable man is
37. Id. at 674.
38. Id. at 681.
39. Jewel, supra note 31, at 51–52 (detailing the dark side of law’s rigid
categories); Lucille A. Jewel, Silencing Discipline in Legal Education, 49 U. TOL.
L. REV. 657, 664 (2018) (detailing law’s hypercompetitive and hierarchical
culture).
40. Jewel, supra note 36, at 669–71.
41. Steve Sheppard, The Bramble Bush and You: Introduction to KARL
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, at ix–x (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (1930).
42. Jewel, supra note 31, at 47–51.
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anthropomorphic and animated by legal language, he is analogous to
a golem, the anthropomorphic creature from mystical Jewish
traditions. The golem metaphor is apt because it allows us to ask—
what kind of written thought patterns are we putting into our
reasonable man and what kind of monster results? The ancient myth
holds that golems are unshaped figures made of clay.43 One of the
earliest known incarnations of the myths has a Talmudic sage named
Rava create a man out of clay, but who could not talk.44 Rava sent
the golem to another sage named Rav Zeira, who spoke to the golem
but was not answered.45 Rav Zeira then commanded the golem to
disintegrate by saying: “You have been created by one of my
colleagues, return to dust.”46 The golem myth became a popular
fixation in Judaism’s kabala, or mystical traditions.
Many explanations rose up to explain the golem and the mystical
methods that could animate it.47 All of the methods centered upon
the use of words to give life, whether through reciting an incantation,
inserting text into the golem, or inscribing text on the golem’s
forehead.48 One of the most common legends instructs that an amulet
containing the Hebrew word émeth be placed on the golem’s forehead
to animate the form.49 To turn off the golem’s spirit, one letter, the
Aleph, should be removed, leaving meth in its place.50 Meth means
death.51
In contemporary culture, golems began to take shape as a
monster, a Frankenstein-like figure who, similar to The Incredible
Hulk or The Terminator, can no longer be controlled by their
creators.52 In legal scholarship, golem references mostly appear in
reference to artificial intelligence and cloning.53 And, one law review
43. YUDL ROSENBERG, THE GOLEM AND THE WONDROUS DEEDS OF THE
MAHARAL OF PRAGUE xiii (Curt Leviant ed. & trans., 2007).
44. Id. at xiii–xiv.
45. Id. at xiv.
46. Id.
47. Id. at xv.
48. Id.
49. Id.; CATHY S. GELBIN, THE GOLEM RETURNS: FROM GERMAN ROMANTIC
LITERATURE TO GLOBAL JEWISH CULTURE 8 (2011).
50. ROSENBERG, supra note 43, at xv; GELBIN, supra note 49, at 8.
51. ROSENBERG, supra note 43, at xv.
52. See GELBIN, supra note 49, at 1, 8–9, 71–73 (explaining that the golem
can be understood as a sort of “friendly Jewish Frankenstein” and providing
multiple stories of golems exhibiting monstrous, uncontrollable behavior); Omer
Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Taming the Golem: Challenges of Ethical Algorithmic
Decision-Making, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 125, 132–33 (2017) (explaining that in one
version of the golem narrative, when a woman rejected a golem’s amorous
advances, the golem became irate and uncontrollable) (internal citation omitted);
see also MAYA BARZILAI, GOLEM: MODERN WARS AND THEIR MONSTERS 3 (2016).
53. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, 2016 Sidley Austin Distinguished Lecture on
Big Data Law and Policy: The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78
OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1222 (2017); Michael Broyde, Cloning People: A Jewish Law
Analysis of the Issues, 30 CONN. L. REV. 503, 521 (1998); E. Donald Shapiro et al.,

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3507504
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3507504

1058

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

article has analogized the corporation to a golem.54 While the golem
is present in legal scholarship, a review of the literature shows that
no scholar has considered whether the reasonable man resembles a
golem. Below, I develop the metaphor for the reasonable man as
golem, focusing on three points: (1) the golem and the reasonable man
are both anthropomorphic creatures; (2) the golem and the reasonable
man both center on the power of language; and (3) the golem and the
reasonable man both have a tendency to become monstrous.
For the reasonable man, the golem is an apt metaphor because
the golem embodies a set of fairly abstract principles. The golem gives
shape to things that we normally do not see in operation all at once.
The golem construct allows us to see all of the things that constitute
the creature and consider whether we should change some of the
ingredients.
The golem metaphor becomes more grounded when we consider
the special power that legal language has to make things real.55 With
its process of animating and de-animating the golem through words,
the golem myth celebrates the role that language plays in creating
culture.56 Like lawyers and judges, who use words to create dynamic
meanings with material consequences,57 the golem myth recognizes
that “language is pregnant with creative potency, . . . language has
the power to create worlds as well as words.”58 This mystical
conception of the golem myth mirrors the perspective of Professor
James Boyd White, who writes of law as “an activity of mind and
language . . . , a way of claiming meaning for experience and making
that meaning real.”59 Like the Jewish mystics in the legend who
carefully devised the words that would give life to the golem, lawyers
and judges deploy words to create meanings—liable, guilty,
enforceable—that carry real consequences.
Because of legal
language’s enormous potency, legal words have the capacity to bring
about tragedy and death.60 The golem myth warns us that too much
power in language can sometimes backfire, our creation can become
To Clone or Not to Clone, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 25 (2001); Tene &
Polonetsky, supra note 52, at 133.
54. Douglas Litowitz, The Corporation as God, 30 J. CORP. L. 501, 513 (2005)
(“[T]he mythical status of corporate law can be seen most clearly in its
centerpiece, namely the corporation itself-an invisible and ephemeral being that
is brought to life with texts, much like a medieval Golem.”).
55. See supra notes 33–35 and surrounding text.
56. BYRON L. SHERWIN, THE GOLEM LEGEND ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS 5
(1985) (“The idea that human beings can share in God’s creative power by
mastering formulae that combine and permutate letters of the alphabet is
rabbinic in origin.”).
57. See James Boyd White, An Old-Fashioned View of the Nature of Law, 12
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 381, 390–91 (2011).
58. SHERWIN, supra note 56, at 7.
59. White, supra note 57, at 386.
60. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601
(1986).
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monstrous. When the legal system takes on attributes of the
monstrous, the golem metaphor allows us to consider the role that
legal language plays, or played, in that transformation.
The golem metaphor also allows us to ask whether the reasonable
man is a monster. When the golem becomes unlatched from the
control of his human creator, sometimes the consequences are dire.
In the folklore, Rabbis skilled in the correct use of animating
language created golems to perform household tasks, and, in later
incarnations, to protect communities from violent anti-Semitic
attacks.61 But, as the golem grows in strength, it “ultimately runs
amok and attempts to destroy its surroundings,” causing quite a bit
of damage.62 The “earth magic” used to animate the golem carries the
possibility of awakening destructive and chaotic chthonic forces.63
The golem eventually becomes a monster.
In culture, monsters are menacing, uncontrollable, behemoth,
and comprised of multiple competing concepts and ideas.64 Monster
derives from the Latin verb monere, which means “to warn.”65 The
nominalized form of the verb is “monstrum,” which means “divine
portent.”66 A monster is a living thing that strikes fear because of its
anomalous shape or structure, and is often thought to signal the
occurrence of a supernatural event.67 In the case of a golem, there is
fear because large statues made of clay are not supposed to be
animated.
The law is not usually viewed as a monster because the law is
fueled by abstract categories; we do not often see the parts and
appendages that animate it. Nonetheless, at least one scholar has
cast the law as a monster. For instance, in writing about how to
perform a comparative analysis between two legal cultures, Professor
Pierre Legrand casts the law as a monster, “an indissoluble amalgam
of historical, social, economic, political, cultural, and psychological
data, a compound hybrid, a ‘monster,’ an ‘outrageous and
heterogeneous collag[e].’”68 The legal system may operate as a
monster because it sometimes produces injustice not through the
actions of one judge or one decision but through deep-seated
structural69 action with many different actors.
61. BARZILAI, supra note 52, at 3 (internal citation omitted).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 229 n.4 (citing Gershom Scholem, The Idea of the Golem, in ON THE
KABBALAH AND ITS SYMBOLISM 202 (Ralph Manheim trans., 1969)).
64. See id.
65. Susan Stryker, My Words to Victor Frankenstein Above the Village of
Chamounix: Performing Transgender Rage, 1 GLQ: J. GAY & LESBIAN STUD. 237,
240 (2011).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Pierre Legrand, How to Compare Now, 16 LEGAL STUD. 232, 236 (1996)
(quoting Law, supra note 21, at 18).
69. Structuralists
are
concerned
with
“identifying
deeper,
underlying . . . patterns that find expression in surface level cultural forms.”
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The reasonable man may also operate as a monster. As a being
who resides within the judge’s psyche, the reasonable man
fastidiously organizes and categorizes; this sometimes results in a
hierarchical order that ignores the rights, experiences, and dreams of
the people who do not fit into his paradigm. An analysis of judicial
decisions that comprise the reasonable man’s case history reveals a
destructive wake. When we look closely at the reasonable man
inhabiting the judges that are authoring these decisions, we can
perceive the frightening contours of a monster. The golem/monster
metaphor will help us uncover the pieces that make up the reasonable
man and also learn about how and why he becomes monstrous. And,
if he is sick and monstrous, we can consider how to fix him, how to
make this construct work for the wellbeing of all stakeholders in the
legal system.
IV. THE REASONABLE MAN’S BACKGROUND
The reasonable man is an amalgam of various ethnic and cultural
traits, all of which shed light on his animating features. The lawculture-law or culture-law-culture cycle, where culture feeds into law,
which then feeds back into culture, and so on, is instructive for this
part of our thought experiment.70 Like the men who originally
animated him in their image, the reasonable man is white, AngloSaxon, and Protestant (“WASP”).71 As a WASP, he enjoys racial,
religious, and class privilege. He is also reasonable, believing that
rationality promotes both order and liberty.72 The reasonable man is
someone who treasures order. This predilection, however, can become
so obsessive that it becomes a social disorder,73 a disorder that
perhaps arises out of an atavistic human need to be free from danger
and uncertainty.
Understanding the cultural origins of law helps us understand
how our law became the way it is. As an anthropomorphic creature,
the reasonable man construct generates new knowledge because it
allows us to analyze the law’s collective issues under the lens of
individual psychology. Accordingly, this part of my Article will delve
John W. Mohr, Introduction: Structures, Institutions, and Cultural Analysis, 27
POETICS 57, 57 (2000). Susan Carle uses the term “structural” to refer to how
social structures determine inequalities of power and resources that can in turn
affect how lawyers approach advocacy for their clients. Susan Carle, Structure
and Integrity, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1311, 1318–22 (2008).
70. See Elizabeth B. Megale, Disaster Unaverted: Reconciling the Desire for
a Safe and Secure State with the Grim Realities of Stand Your Ground, 37 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 255, 257 (2013).
71. See supra Parts IV.A–IV.D.
72. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937) (Cardozo, J.)
(finding that ordered liberty as the animating principle behind the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process clause); RUSSELL KIRK, THE AMERICAN CAUSE 48–49
(2002) (discussing the enlightenment origins of the concept of ordered liberty).
73. See infra notes 256–71 and surrounding text.
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into relevant attributes of the reasonable man, both cultural and
legal.
A.

The Reasonable Man is White/Anglo-Saxon
Unsurprisingly, the reasonable man originated as white and of
Anglo-Saxon descent.74 “At common law, white Anglo-Saxon males
were the lawmakers. Thus, what was deemed reasonable was based
upon the experiences and attitudes of these individuals.”75 The white
and Anglo-Saxon legal persona has been idealized as “‘clean cut,’
graduating from the ‘right’ schools, having the ‘right’ social
background and experience in the affairs of the world, and [with
being] endowed with tremendous stamina.”76 Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, who concretized the reasonable man in his jurisprudence,
instantiates the reasonable man’s race and culture. As an upper-class
Boston “Brahmin,” he enjoyed “impregnable security.”77 White AngloSaxon lineage brought a lot of “right,” which amounted to cultural
power, with might.78 Moreover, the reasonable man’s white AngloSaxon lineage connects closely with his other attributes. The
reasonable man’s Protestant religion holds that an inherently
unequal social order is a good thing.79 Also, reason, as it turns out,
has a long history of exalting the Anglo-Saxon race as a superior race
over all others.80
B. The Reasonable Man’s Theocratic Protestantism Elevated Order
Over Equality
The reasonable man was and is a Protestant Christian. Virtually
all the powerful people in law, at around the time the reasonable man
was conceived, were WASP men.81 Catholics, Jews, and other
religions were not included in the club.82 We’ve discussed the white
74. Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race
Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CINC. L. REV.
269, 297 (1994) (“[T]he ‘reasonable [man]’ is understood . . . to be white, male,
heterosexual, able-bodied, and class privileged.”); Sarah McLean, Harassment in
the Workplace: When Will the Reactions of Ethnic Minorities and Women Be
Considered Reasonable?, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 593, 599–601 (2001) (internal
citations omitted).
75. McLean, supra note 74, at 600.
76. ERWIN SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 37 (1974).
77. ALSCHULER, supra note 5, at 16.
78. Holmes, a Darwinist, believed that “might made right.” Id.
79. See infra notes 81–100 and 107–08 and surrounding text.
80. See IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE BEGINNING: THE DEFINITIVE
HISTORY OF RACIST IDEAS IN AMERICA 43–46, 55–56 (2017); DOROTHY ROBERTS,
FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 28–35 (2011).
81. See Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law
Schools Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV.
1155, 1176–77 (2008).
82. See id.

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3507504
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3507504

1062

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

Anglo-Saxon part of WASP, but what can we learn from the P in the
acronym? In the United States, Protestantism is not a monolithic
category; there are very large distinctions between belief systems and
denominations. For this Article, I’ve drawn upon David Hackett
Fischer’s lucid cultural history83 and focused on Puritanism and the
Anglican/Episcopal Church, two religious traditions that date to
colonial times. I have focused on these two belief systems to explore
the reasonable man’s theology because of their potent cultural
influence, from colonial times to the present.84 The majority of the
Constitution’s framers were Anglican.85 And, the Massachusetts Bay
Colony’s Puritans, who strived to forge “a society based on order,
reason, and compliance,” soon became the cultural blueprint for elite
East Coast culture from colonial times up to the present.86
The other two cultural strains that Fischer identified, the
Quakers and the Presbyterian Scottish Irish, did not much influence
the reasonable man’s mindset. In terms of religious attitudes toward
social order, the Quakers were radically egalitarian, so much so that
they did not wield much influence on America’s political economy.87
The Scottish Irish exuberant style of worship was at odds with the
restrained style of the Puritans and the ritualistic style of the
Anglicans.88 As American culture evolved, the restrained style came
to be associated with upper-class culture, stereotypically WASP, the
extroverted style with working class culture.
In contrast to
Puritanism and Anglicanism, the more extraverted, evangelical
denominations do not match the reasonable man’s originating
culture. While Roman Catholicism and Judaism share many of the
83. See generally DAVID H. FISCHER, ALBION’S SEED: FOUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS
(1989) (explaining how four discrete areas of British culture impacted
and continues to impact American culture).
84. See generally id. (discussing the large cultural influence of New
England’s Puritan and Virginia’s Anglican religion, and to a certain extent
Quakerism). Fischer’s other British folkway, the folkways of the Scottish Irish
people, who worshiped as Presbyterians (later Methodists and Baptists), never
became equated with “elite” or “aristocratic” American values in the same way as
the Puritan and Anglican denominations. See JIM WEBB, BORN FIGHTING 289–90
(2004).
The Scottish Irish cultural emphasis on individual rights and
responsibilities, springing from their spirited Calvinist theology, stood in
contrast to both the rigorously ordered Puritan culture of New England and the
Anglican culture of Virginia. See id.
85. KIRK, supra note 72, at 45.
86. WEBB, supra note 84, at 289–90.
87. See KENDI, supra note 79, at 62 (Quakers were opposed to slavery since
colonial times). For instance, while U.S. Presidents have hailed from a variety of
Protestant backgrounds, only one, Richard Milhouse Nixon (ironically), was a
Quaker. Quakers did have a large impact on American civil liberties, particularly
freedom of religion, but in terms of social equality, their radical anti-racist and
abolitionist attitudes made them outliers. See id.; see also Carol Loar, Quakers,
in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AMERICA 763–64 (David Schultz &
John Vile eds., 2015).
88. See FISCHER, supra note 83, at 117–25, 336, 705–07.
IN AMERICA
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same beliefs as American Protestantism, I do not address Judaism or
Catholicism in this Article because, due to anti-Semitic and antiCatholic bias, these two religions were not cultural influencers in law
at the time the reasonable man was being forged (the 1800s).89
One final foundational point—in colonial times, Puritanism and
Anglicanism were religious and legal systems.
Puritan
Massachusetts Bay Colony and Anglican Virginia operated as
theocracies. The church ferreted out wrongdoing and meted out the
punishment.90
As the reasonable man was being forged, his Christian theology
emphasized the good that comes from order, even at the expense of
equality. “Among the Puritan founders of Massachusetts, order was
an obsession.”91 The Puritans regarded ancient Greek and Latin
thinkers as sources of universal truths and, accordingly, studied
Aristotle alongside the Bible.92 From Aristotle, the Puritans “learned
rationales for human hierarchy, and they began to believe that some
groups were superior to other groups.”93 The Puritans believed in
organic unity for the good of the whole, meaning that everyone must
observe his/her proper station in the hierarchy.94 There was a
definitive gender and racial component to the hierarchy. Relations

89. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE, LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 50 (1976) (explaining that at the beginning of the
20th century, Catholic and Jewish lawyers were excluded from elite positions of
power (such as professional rules committees)); SMIGEL, supra note 76, at 370
(Catholic lawyers were heavily discriminated against in the legal profession,
until the 1960s); David Wilkins, Ronit Dinovitzer & Rishi Batra, Urban Law
School Graduates in Large Law Firms, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 433, 442–43 (2007)
(explaining that Jewish law graduates were not able to break into elite legal
circles until the 1960s; before then, law was a bastion for white, Anglo-Saxon,
Protestant males). The one outlier in this Article is Justice Roger Taney, the
author of the Dred Scott decision, who was Roman Catholic. See infra note 189.
90. In colonial Virginia, church attendance was mandatory, and the law
required ministers to preach in the morning and catechize in the afternoon.
FISCHER, supra note 83, at 234; WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT
LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE
LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR, VOL. I, at 385 (1823) [hereinafter HENING VOL. I].
Church wardens were responsible for policing religious crimes (like blasphemy,
swearing, and drunkenness) and sending violators to the County Court to be
punished. Id. at 310. Sabbath breaking was also a religious crime. Id. at 434.
In Puritan Massachusetts, the town “tithingman” inspected families to ensure
good order and reported wrongdoing to the appropriate church authorities.
FISCHER, supra note 83, at 72. It bears mentioning that Margaret Atwood’s
dystopian Handmaid’s Tale was based, in part, upon the Puritan laws in place in
the colonial Massachusetts Bay Colony. How Margaret Atwoods’s Puritan
Ancestors Inspired the Handmaid’s Tale, CBC RADIO (June 8, 2017),
https://www.cbc.ca/radio/tapestry/religion-utopia-or-dystopia-1.4143654/howmargaret-atwood-s-puritan-ancestors-inspired-the-handmaid-s-tale-1.4143718.
91. FISCHER, supra note 83, at 189.
92. KENDI, supra note 80, at 16.
93. Id. at 16.
94. Id. at 189–90.
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between the sexes “rested on an assumption of inequality”95 and the
belief that the husband was the head of the wife, who must submit to
him.96 As to race, famed Puritan preacher Cotton Mather “preached
racial inequality in body while insisting that the dark souls of
enslaved Africans would become white when they became
Christians.”97 On this point, the Puritans were influenced by both St.
Paul and Aristotle. Aristotle’s view was that hierarchy was natural
in human relations, that the Greeks were better than the
barbarians.98 Using this rationale, the Puritans believed that they
were superior to indigenous people, African people, and other nonPuritans.99 They believed, like Aristotle, that slaves were not capable
of reason or having autonomy.100 St. Paul similarly opined that it was
the slave’s required duty to obey his/her earthly master.101
Puritan law utilized public shaming punishments to maintain
order. The Puritans enforced the law in a very visual and corporal
way. As delineated in Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter,
Puritan law often required criminals to wear the literal letter of the
law on their clothing—A for adultery, B for blasphemy or burglary, C
for counterfeiting, D for drunkenness, and so on.102 Occasionally, an
infraction warranted a branding on the face.103 For instance,
practicing Quakers could get the letter H (for heretic) branded on
their face with a burning hot iron.104 Beyond branding, violations of
order warranted other terrible corporal punishments. The most
extreme punishment in Puritan law was for petty treason, defined as
the killing of masters by servants.105 There are two recorded
instances of people being burned at the stake in Massachusetts—and
both were black women accused of killing their master.106 The
reasonable man’s religious-legal roots tended to conflate whiteness
with piousness and to denigrate “The Other” as outside of God’s grace.
Sometimes this was accomplished with violence.
Similar to the Puritans, the Anglican faith also treasured order
maintained through categories. Colonial Virginians would have
listened to the Anglican “Homily of Obedience,” which teaches that
“Almighty God has created and appointed all things in heaven, earth
and water, in a most excellent and perfect order. . . . Every degree of
95. FISCHER, supra note 83, at 83.
96. Id. at 84.
97. KENDI, supra note 80, at 6.
98. Id. at 339; see also ARTHUR LOVEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING 58–59
(1971).
99. KENDI, supra note 80, at 339.
100. Id. at 346.
101. Id. (quoting Colossians 3:22 (King James)).
102. FISCHER, supra note 83, at 195.
103. See HENING VOL. I, supra note 90, at 254–55 (A colonial Virginia statute
mandating that runaway servants be branded with the letter R on the face).
104. Id. at 194.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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people in their vocations, calling and office hath appointed to them
their duty and order. Some are in high degree; some in low . . . .”107
The Homily of Obedience represents the Christian/Aristotelian
concept of The Great Chain of Being—“an immense . . . number of
links ranging in hierarchical order from the meagerest kind of
existence . . . to the highest possible kind of creature.”108 In the
Anglican faith, inequality was accomplished through divinely
sanctioned categories. Enslaved persons of color, women and
indentured servants were duty-bound to accept their lowly place.
In colonial Virginia’s theocracy, boundary transgressors109 were
met with painful, shameful, and public punishments, through public
whippings, the pillory, stocks, and ducking stool.110
These
punishments were not equally administered.111 Women and people of
color, by law, received harsher punishments.112 “Unruly” women
were dunked using the infamous ducking stool; men were not subject
to this punishment.113 For an offense like hog stealing, the statute
provided that a person of color was to receive thirty-nine lashes, while
a white person’s sentence was set at twenty-five lashes.114 Like
Puritan law, the law in colonial Virginia also utilized branding and
grisly capital punishment. Runaway slaves were branded with the
letter R on their face, although the law was later softened to allow the
branding on the shoulder rather than the cheek.115 The crime of
treason, broadly formulated to address serious crimes occurring in the
context of master and servant, master and slave, and husband and
wife,116 was punishable by death through burning or hanging.117 In
107. An Exhortation to Obedience, THE ANGLICAN BOOK OF HOMILIES (quoted
in FISCHER, supra note 83, at 398).
108. LOVEJOY, supra note 98, at 59.
109. For instance, in colonial Virginia, crimes for which whipping was the
punishment included disobeying one’s captain, cutting tobacco plants, cursing,
and drunkenness. WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE
LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, VOL. IV, at 107 (1820) (sea captain disobedience);
HENING VOL. I, supra note 90, at 164 (tobacco cutting); WILLIAM WALLER HENING,
THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM
THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, VOL. III, at 153 (1823)
[hereinafter HENING VOL. III] (cursing and drunkenness).
110. KATHLEEN BROWN, GOOD WIVES, NASTY WENCHES, AND ANXIOUS
PATRIARCHS: GENDER, RACE, AND POWER IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 147–48 (2012)
(discussing Virginia’s ducking stool for “brabling” women).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 147–48, 236.
113. For instance, the ducking stool punishment, in which the offender was
strapped and then dunked into a pond or creek was reserved for colonial women
only. Men were not dunked. Id. at 147–48.
114. HENING VOL. III, supra note 109, at 179.
115. HENING VOL. I, supra note 90, at 255, 440.
116. HUGH F. RANKIN, CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE GENERAL COURT
OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 223–35 (1965); ARTHUR P. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN
COLONIAL VIRGINIA 195, 298, 305 (1930).
117. SCOTT, supra note 116, at 161–62; RANKIN, supra note 116, at 225.
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some cases, the bodies of the executed were dismembered and
displayed in public places.118
In Massachusetts and Virginia, colonists adhered to a rigid social
order fueled by religious belief. Through painful and shameful
punishments, the Puritan and Anglican theocracy kept individuals in
their proper place. These systems were based on a “natural law”
embedded in the structure of the universe that is supposed to provide
moral direction.119 This compulsion to keep order likely has an
atavistic explanation. Because disorder likely enhanced the risks of
danger in earlier incarnations of European communities, a lawculture-law cycle instantiated a religious-legal system where order
reigned at the expense of equality.
Order was upheld in a painful and visual manner. By branding
with hot irons, American colonists named the offense and placed that
name on the body of the offender. There was a literalness to the way
the law operated that connected the law’s language to the offending
person being categorized and punished. The golem metaphor aligns
with the practice of branding as well. When the colonists used
branding punishments, they literally placed the letter of the law on
the body of the offender to place the offender in his/her categorical
place. To animate a golem, the legend has the Rabbi placing precise
words, written on an amulet, on the forehead of the form. In the
legend, words created life. In law, the correct words created a visual
reality as well; the category was reified through pain on the body.
As a rigorous form of categorizing, branding is analogous to the
reasonable man’s formalistic legal process. Even as it operates now,
on a more abstract level, the results are sometimes no less violent.120
The reasonable man was born out of a culture where law and religion
were intertwined. Combining logocentric rules with sacred values
strengthened the vitality of these law-culture-law seeds. The visual,
embodied, religious, and legal aspects of the system worked together
to implant categorical thought processes into the reasonable man.
These collective thought patterns developed a sturdy root structure
that remains fertile in American legal culture to this day.
C. The Reasonable Man’s “Reason” has Historically Justified
Inequality
The reasonable man is dedicated to enlightenment principles of
rationality. He shares this predilection with classical legal analysis,
which treasures coherence and integrity in bright line category

118. SCOTT, supra note 116, at 161–62; RANKIN, supra note 116, at 225.
119. CHARLES MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT 15 (1999).
120. See generally Cover, supra note 60 (discussing legal interpretation and
the violence it causes).
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boundaries.121 This system of formalism reinforced inequality.122
Unequal order, rank, and hierarchy was a recurring theme in
enlightenment thought. A nearly universal premise was that only
white European men had the ability to be reasonable, to participate
in a democracy, and to be fully human:123
In [enlightenment] philosophy, one [can] trace this common
[racial] thread through Locke’s speculations on the incapacities
of primitive minds, David Hume’s denial that any other race but
whites had created worthwhile civilizations, Kant’s thoughts on
the rationality differentials between blacks and whites,
Voltaire’s polygenetic conclusion that blacks were a distinct and
less able species, John Stuart Mill’s judgment that those races
“in their nonage” were fit only for “despotism.” The assumption
of nonwhite intellectual inferiority was widespread, even if not
always tricked out in the pseudoscientific apparatus that
Darwinism would later make possible.124

The enlightenment’s vogue for natural science instigated a large
number of “rational” and “scientific” theories that sought to
substantiate the contours of colonized human hierarchy with
elaborately theorized taxonomies.125
Visual categorization
dominated these endeavors. Britain’s Royal Society, comprised of
scientists in many fields, stoked the human taxonomy trend in
Britain and the colonies. Theories were popularized in journals such
as Philosophical Transactions, published by the Royal Society or the
Journal des Sçavans in Paris.126 In 1664, Royal Society member
Robert Boyle, the father of English chemistry, theorized that white
skin was normal and that black skin was an “ugly” deformity.127
Boyle asserted that the physics of light proved that whiteness was
“the chiefest color.”128 In 1677, British economist William Petty
created a hierarchical “scale of humanity,” which placed non-white
people at the bottom.129 In 1684, François Bernier wrote an essay
entitled A New Division of the Earth, which placed Europeans at the
top, over Africans, East Asians, and other groups.130 In 1689, John
Locke, who dabbled in natural science, wrote of his belief that African
women had conceived infants with apes.131

121. MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960,
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 199 (1992).
122. See infra notes 178–209 and surrounding text.
123. MILLS, supra note 119, at 59–60.
124. Id.
125. See ROBERTS, supra note 80, at 28–36.
126. KENDI, supra note 80, at 65.
127. Id. at 54.
128. Id. at 54 (citation omitted).
129. Id. at 65.
130. Id. at 66.
131. Id. at 60.
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Enlightenment thinkers routinely used rationality to justify
racial oppression, inequality, and violence. Enlightenment thinker
François Bernier wrote that that “[t]hose who excel in the powers of
the mind . . . [should] command those who only excel in brute
force.”132 Bernier’s friend, John Locke, justified colonial slavery
because “slaves, who being captives taken in a just war, are by the
right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary
power of their masters.”133
We do not need to beat a dead horse and discuss the myriad
reasons why these racialized enlightenment theories failed on
scientific and moral grounds. It is worth pointing out, however, that
the rational enlightenment thinkers operated on a major fallacy,
which is that reason itself is disembodied and can be separated from
the body and be free from emotion.134 Thinking is a deeply embodied
process—we access the neural pathways that connect to our body (our
hands, legs, torso, etc.) every time we interact with the world.135
Another point for skepticism is that reason, very often, does not even
produce conscious decisions. Unconscious emotions and biases are
always interfering with the reasoning process.136 Research on
implicit bias, cognitive bias, behavioral economics, and persuasion
psychology show that the mind is not entirely separable from the
body.137 The ideal of rational “reason” does not match up with how
people really think.138
This Article does not argue for a take-down of all enlightenment
texts as they relate to law. Western enlightenment principles have
produced a massive amount of good knowledge. Camille Paglia’s
assessment is that enlightenment thought, particularly the scientific
method, has produced beautiful results. In her view, “Greek
philosophy and logic, revived at the Renaissance and refined in the
seventeenth century, produced the archeological technique of
controlled excavation [using a grid], measurement, documentation,
identification, and categorization.”139 In archeology, enlightenment
methods have produced breathtaking knowledge that delineates the
narratives of lost and ancient civilizations. Enlightenment tools—
formal categories, measurement, quantification—have been of great
use for solving complex legal problems.
But there is a point where a devotion to Western enlightenment
principles can be taken too far, particularly when speakers completely
132. Id. at 67.
133. Id. at 59–60 (citation omitted).
134. See generally LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 31 (explaining how the
Western philosophic tradition ignores the role that the human body and emotion
play in the process of formulating knowledge and ideas).
135. Jewel, supra note 31, at 45.
136. Id.
137. Jewel, supra note 39, at 674.
138. Id.
139. CAMILLE PAGLIA, PROVOCATIONS 385 (2019).
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deny that there are any other methods for producing knowledge.140
For instance, an overly broad dedication to Western enlightenment
principles places limits on the value of concrete personal experience
and denies collective experience as a basis for knowledge, particularly
if the evidence cannot be shown in an atomistic or linear way.141 NonWestern epistemological traditions hold otherwise, looking to
collective perspectives, non-linear narratives, and personal
experience to find truth.142 The discussion here situates Western
reason critically in order to evaluate the reasonable man’s personality
and to consider whether his devotion to order has been too slavish.
In the 1700s, 1800s, and 1900s, Enlightenment thinkers exalted
the power of reason. Woven throughout the Enlightenment zeitgeist
was the principle that hierarchy is natural and correct.
Enlightenment thinkers excluded other people who were not white,
European, and male from the category of people who could be
reasonable and participate in democracy. These privileged men then
categorized, ranked, and theorized systems of social order. The
Enlightenment thinkers popularized a way of thinking, a method that
emphasized the organizing, ranking, and categorizing things and
people, which was also imbued with the valence of being reasonable,
and therefore good. As a successful cultural meme, Enlightenment
thought became embedded in the culture, which then influenced the
law.143
Enlightenment ideas are the foundation of the reasonable man’s
mammalian brain, playing a heavy role in his formation.144 During
the reasonable man’s formation, however, there was little discussion
of the reptilian brain, the situs where unconscious emotions, biases,
and heuristics can produce fallacious conclusions.145 No attention
was devoted to the ways in which social, racial, and cultural
oppression created enduring systems that perpetuated inequality.146
Enlightenment thought constructs a clean grid upon which to
study the necessary and sufficient conditions for various contentions.
Enlightenment thought generally eschews messy context. In judicial
140. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL
REASON: THE ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997) (rejecting critical
theories of law [critical race, feminist, and LGBTQ] as legitimate tools for legal
process).
141. Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, The Rhetoric of Race, Redemption, and Will
Contests: Inheritance as Reparations in John Grisham’s Sycamore Row, 48 U.
MEM. L. REV. 889, 897, 910 (2018).
142. Id. at 897.
143. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 192 (2006).
144. Parker, supra note 2, at 105.
145. ANN MARIE SEWARD BARRY, VISUAL INTELLIGENCE, PERCEPTION, IMAGE,
AND MANIPULATION IN VISUAL COMMUNICATION 16–17 (1997).
146. See generally Jewel, supra note 81; Lucille A. Jewel, Merit and Mobility:
A Progressive View of Class, Culture, and the Law, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 239 (2012)
(explaining how law, in the context of higher education, masks the way that preexisting forms of capital influence individual social outcomes).
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decisions, the absence of context (social, racial, and cultural) often
produces short-sighted and tone-deaf outcomes.147 How much of our
current legal system’s faults (access to justice, massive racial
disparities in incarceration, law enforcement’s overuse of force
against persons of color) derive from the reasonable man’s fetish for
human ranking and order?
D. The Reasonable Man is a Male, a Disciplinarian Father, and a
Judge
The reasonable man is a male, a father, and a judge. These
aspects create a personality that is strict, disciplinarian, and rule
oriented. Not surprisingly, the reasonable man is male in both sex
and gender. Although the nomenclature has evolved so that
reasonable person is now the accepted term, the legal construct
remains male.148 In 1837, when the reasonable man first appeared in
the English common law,149 “no woman in the entire Western world
was eligible to vote. Further, women were not considered to be
persons of full legal capacity.”150 Because women were rarely named
defendants or plaintiffs in torts cases, the “stereotypical maleness did
not seem inappropriate” for the reasonable man construct.151
The reasonable man is also a father. His ancient origins can be
traced to Roman law, where he was known as the bonus pater familias
(the good father of the family).152 In contemporary parlance, the
reasonable man has been described as “the man who takes the
magazines at home, and in the evening pushes the lawn mower in his
shirt sleeves,”153 a mid-century modern image that conjures Ward
Cleaver from Leave It to Beaver.154
We might say, however, that the reasonable man is far stricter
than Ward Cleaver ever was. Pursuant to cultural conceptions of
fatherhood in place at the time of his conception, gestation, and birth,
the reasonable man’s parenting style emphasizes discipline and
punishment. Judeo-Christian traditions influenced early American
parents to practice strict corporal discipline, following the Old
Testament’s recommendation not to spare the rod for disobedient
147. See Regina Austin, “Bad for Business”: Contextual Analysis, Race
Discrimination, and Fast Food, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 207, 207 (2000).
148. Bender, supra note 12, at 21–23; see also Kastely, supra note 74, at 297;
McLean, supra note 74, at 599–601; Parker, supra note 2, at 108–09; William
Joseph Wagner, Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law by Guido Calabresi, 35
CATH. U. L. REV. 335, 341 (1985) (book review).
149. Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 468, 3 Bing. N.C. 468.
150. Parker, supra note 2, at 108.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 105 (citing GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES AND THE
LAW 23 (1985)).
153. Id. at 105–06 (citing Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club [1933] 1 KB
205 at 224 (Eng.)).
154. Leave it to Beaver (CBS television broadcast 1957–58, ABC television
broadcast 1958–63).
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children.155 For instance, the Puritans believed that children were
born naturally depraved and must have their wills “strained and
repressed.”156
George Lakoff’s “strict father” metaphor also illuminates this
piece of the reasonable man’s personality. Lakoff describes how the
strict father metaphor explains much about American political
thought, particularly tropes that focus on individual responsibility
and constraint.157 The strict father metaphor situates citizens as
children and the state as the parent; if citizens fail in some way (being
charged with a crime, being poor, etc.), they must be subject to
discipline and punished.158 The metaphor is based on the traditional
nuclear family where the father sets the rules and enforces them
against his children.159 The strict father is the judge who enforces the
rules.160 Through the father’s behavioral sticks (not many carrots),
children do things they do not want to do and eventually become able
to independently think, live, and thrive in a competitive
individualistic society.161
The strict father is the definitive head of the family with
responsibility for protecting and supporting the family. The mother,
who is a metaphor for caring and nurturance (a cornerstone of
liberal/progressive thought), is part of the family as well, and provides
necessary value, but she is below the father in the family hierarchy.162
In this sense, the family fits into a “folk theory of natural
order, . . . the order of dominance that occurs in the natural world.”163
Lakoff’s model of the family is “a model that Americans grow up
knowing implicitly.”164
The strict father model of parenting has deep roots in American
culture. In the colonial era, both the Puritan and Anglican
approaches to parenting positioned children as objects to be molded.
Puritans believed that newborn children were naturally depraved

155. Proverbs 13:24 (King James) (“He that spareth his rod hateth his
son . . . .”).
156. FISCHER, supra note 83, at 94.
157. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND
CONSERVATIVES THINK 65–107 (2016) (explaining the family as a metaphor for
American political thought for conservatives [the strict father model] and
progressives [the nurturant mother model]). Drawing upon the theories of
French sociologist Emile Durkheim, social psychologist Jonathan Haidt identifies
a similar stock structure for society. For Haidt, this world is “usually
hierarchical, punitive, and religious. It places limits on people’s autonomy, and
it endorses traditions, often including traditional gender roles.” JONATHAN
HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND 193 (2012).
158. LAKOFF, supra note 157, at 153–55, 162–65, 169–73.
159. Id. at 65–66.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 67–68.
162. Id. at 81; LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 318.
163. LAKOFF, supra note 157, at 81.
164. Id. at 67.

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3507504
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3507504

1072

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

and that their wills had to be “restrained and repressed.”165 Puritans
supervised their children quite strictly, requiring “filial awe and
reverence” and that they stand and bow when approached by their
parents.166
Puritan parents did not hesitate to physically torment their
unruly children:
Restless children were rolled into small squirming human balls
with their knees tied firmly beneath their chins, and booted
back and forth across the floor by their elders. Other youngsters
were dangled by their heels out of windows, or forced to kneel
on sharp sticks, or made to sit precariously for long periods on
a one-legged stool called the unipod, or compelled to wear a
painful cleft stick on the tip of the nose. Partners in juvenile
crime were yoked together in miniature versions of an oxbow.
Small malefactors were made to wear shame-signs that
proclaimed their offenses.167

In colonial Virginia, children were treated more indulgently.
Elite children in colonial Virginia were taught, at an early age, to
dominate their inferiors, often receiving enslaved persons as birthday
presents.168 Parents trained their children to take their proper place
in the social hierarchy and to display appropriate manners.169
Virginia parents sought to instill a stoic mastery of the self in their
children.170 Unlike the Puritans, who sought to break the will of their
children, Virginian parents sought to raise children with a will that
was “severely bent against itself.”171 Colonial Virginia culture valued
social place, respect, and a “calm acceptance of life.”172 Puritan
strictness and colonial Virginia’s elite stoicism eventually resurface
in the reasonable man’s strict formalism and his detached and
objective persona.
The folk-values of colonial America made their way into the law,
which constructed the reasonable man as a strict father-judge. As a
threshold concept, Lakoff points out that the concept of “reason” itself
operates on a strict father metaphor, rejecting emotionality,
sentimentality, or context.173 In other words reason requires strict
discipline to guard against the evils of emotional decision-making.
The strict father mentality is discernible in Judge Richard Posner’s

165. FISCHER, supra note 83, at 99 (citations omitted).
166. Id. at 101.
167. Id. at 100.
168. Id. at 311.
169. Id. at 312, 315–16.
169. Id. at 312–17.
171. Id. at 312; see also Judy M. Cornett, Hillbilly Atticus, 69 ALA. L. REV. 561,
572 (2018) (applying Fischer’s conception of Virginia colonial culture to Harper
Lee’s Atticus Finch character).
172. FISCHER, supra note 83, at 316.
173. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 319.
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no-nonsense tone-policing, as he chastised critical race scholars in the
1990s for not deploying “reasonable” arguments:
Rather than marshalling logical arguments and empirical data,
critical race theorists tell stories—fictional, science-fictional,
quasi-fictional, autobiographical, anecdotal—designed to
expose the pervasive and debilitating racism in America today.
By repudiating reasoned argumentation, the storytellers
reinforce stereotypes about the intellectual capacities of
nonwhites.174

Psychologically, the strict father archetype satisfies a hard-wired
human need for safety and certainty in the face of risk and
uncertainty. In the 1930s, legal realist scholar Jerome Frank
forcefully argued that legal actors (lawyers and judges) fetishize
black-and-white legal rules in an effort to “reproduce the father-child
pattern” and return to a childhood of safety and security with a strict
father keeping order.175 “The law—a body of rules apparently devised
for infallibly determining what is right and what is wrong and for
deciding who should be punished for misdeeds—inevitably becomes a
partial substitute for the Father-as-Infallible-Judge.”176 The desire
to “recapture, through rediscovery of a father, a childish, completely
controllable universe” produces an “anthropomorphizing of law” so
that the law itself becomes imbued with the characteristics of the
child’s “Father-Judge.”177
Frank’s prescient theory explains the reasonable man’s
construction as a “Father-Judge,” an infallible godlike figure that
demands order and control within American law. The reasonable
man’s predilection for punitive discipline and control is a coping
mechanism that arises out of his fear of uncertain and unpredictable
situations.
V. SPECIFIC ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE REASONABLE MAN’S
PERSONALITY
As this Article has shown, the reasonable man is an
anthropomorphic creature that stands for the law itself. He is borne
out of distinct subsects of American religion and culture. His
ethnicity, culture, and religion have collectively encouraged him to
exhibit an excessive need for order and control, which derives from
fear of the unknown.178 The reasonable man might have a disorder
174. Richard A. Posner, The Skin Trade, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40,
42 (book review).
175. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 15–16 (1935).
176. Id. at 18.
177. Id.
178. This was Jerome Frank’s thesis about the legal formalist’s mind. Id.
Contemporary neuroscientists have theorized that individuals with conservative
politics (most strongly associated with the strict father metaphor) tend to respond
to fear more strongly than liberals do. Laura Bassett, Conservative Men Are
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such as Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (“OCD”). Before getting to a
possible diagnosis, this Article analyzes a series of cases that
illuminate the reasonable man’s psyche. This case history for the
reasonable man paints a picture of a person who is afraid of social,
racial, and gendered boundary crossing, and, accordingly, clings to
rigid cognitive categories. These cases, considered together, exhibit
black-and-white thinking, judgment, criticism, and sometimes,
violence—all arising out of fear.
A.

Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)
Decided in 1857, a few years before the start of the Civil War, the
Dred Scott decision upheld a rule that wholly excluded descendants
of African slaves from the category of United States citizen.179
Because Mr. Scott, his wife Harriet, and daughters Eliza and Lizzie
were the property of defendant Sandford and not citizens who could
file a lawsuit, the lower court had no jurisdiction to hear Mr. Scott’s
battery case against the defendant, who had physically struck him
and his family.180
For a case that could have been decided with a dry conflict-oflaw/Federalism analysis, Justice Taney devoted a remarkable
amount of text to recounting various state laws criminalizing
marriage and sexual intimacy between blacks and whites.181 As
persuasive precedent for his white supremacist conclusion that
descendants of slaves could not be considered U.S. citizens, Taney
cited a 1717 Maryland statute and three different colonial era
Massachusetts statutes.182
In describing these anti-miscegenation laws, Taney channeled
the strict disciplinarian father, describing how the 1775
Massachusetts anti-miscegenation statute “degrade[d] . . . the
unhappy issue of the marriage by fixing upon it the stain of
bastardy.”183 “Unhappy issue,” “it”—Taney could not even be
Obsessed With Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Science Tells Us Why, HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/conservatives-afraidalexandria-ocasio-cortez_n_5c38cb74e4b05cb31c421cc3; see also LAKOFF &
JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 312, 318. Neuroscientist Bobby Azarian, who studies
anxiety, has explained that conservative men are fixated so heavily on
progressive politician Alexandria Ocasio Cortez because “they fear her.” Bassett,
supra. On a related note, fear also explains why it is so difficult for strong social
safety net programs to gain traction in the U.S. There is a “fear that a strong
social contract will lift up non-white people at the expense of whites.” HEATHER
MCGHEE & LUCY MAYO WITH ANGELA PARK, DĒMOS’ RACIAL EQUITY
TRANSFORMATION: KEY COMPONENTS, PROCESS, & LESSONS 29 (2018),
https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Racial_Equity_Report_.pd
f.
179. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1857).
180. Id. at 454.
181. Id. at 408, 413.
182. Id. at 408–09, 413.
183. Id. at 413 (emphasis added).
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bothered to use human pronouns.184 Taney repeated, three times,
that enslaved persons were merely “ordinary articles of merchandise”
to be trafficked whenever a profit can be made.185 To characterize
enslaved people, Taney used the term “unhappy” three times and
“degraded” or “degradation” four times.186 Through this ugly, toxic
stream of prose, Taney disciplined and punished subjects that
transgressed sexualized and racialized boundaries.
There is an undercurrent of fear that runs throughout Taney’s
verbose opinion. At a time when abolitionist anti-slavery sentiment
was rising, Taney stridently advanced his conclusion that the men
who drafted the Declaration of Independence intended:
a perpetual and impassable barrier . . . to be erected between
the white race and the one which they had reduced to slavery,
and governed as subjects with absolute and despotic power, and
which they then looked upon as so far below them in the scale
of created beings, that intermarriages between white persons
and negroes were regarded as unnatural and immoral, and
punished as crimes, not only in the parties but in the person
who joined them in marriage. And no distinction in this respect
was made between the free negro or mulatto and the slave, but
this stigma, of the deepest degradation, was fixed upon the
whole race.187

Justice Taney’s prose reveals an obsessive and/or compulsive
need to construct impermeable walls to prevent the mixing of
different categories. The fear implicit in Taney’s opinion perhaps
presaged the racial upheaval that would come after the Civil War.
Although the Dred Scott decision is no longer good law, it is a model
for classic American legal formalism, aspects of which are still in use
today.188 Further, Dred Scott exemplifies the Victorian values that
seeded the reasonable man. A starting point for studying the
reasonable man’s psyche, the case frames the foundation for the next
cases in this study.
Justice Taney also used religion to justify the morality of rigid
racial/social categories. In expounding upon the white supremacist
views that animated U.S. law, Taney takes care to explain that the
“great men” who drafted the Declaration of Independence
“looked . . . so far below [people of color] in the scale of created
beings.”189
This “scale of created beings” refers to the

184. Id.
185. Id. at 407, 411, 451.
186. Id. at 409–16.
187. Id. at 409.
188. For the role that legal formalism played in the perpetuation of slavery,
see ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1975).
189. Scott, 60 U.S. at 409–10.
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Christian/Aristotelian concept of the Great Chain of Being.190 For
Justice Taney, it was a good thing that these categories remained
wholly separate and unequal, as that was the natural, divine order of
things.
Taney’s religiously sanctioned racial separatism would appear
years later in 1967, in Loving v. Virginia,191 which overturned
Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage. In that case, the Lovings pled
guilty for violating Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law, which
prohibited interracial marriages. 192 The Virginia state trial court
accepted the Lovings’ guilty plea and banished them from the State
for twenty-five years.193 In the trial court’s decision, the trial judge
stated that:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay, and
red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for
such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that
he did not intend for the races to mix.194

The Supreme Court rejected this bald religious reasoning, finding no
“patently . . . legitimate overriding purpose” of the statute that would
permit such “invidious racial discrimination.”195 Nonetheless, the
reasoning that God created the races intending that they be kept
separate resonated with many Southern whites (and still does).196
The trial court’s decision melded religion with law by mirroring Dred
Scott, the Anglican Homily of Obedience, and the Great Chain of
Being. 197 The desire for rigid categories transcended mere law; this
was a deep-seated thought pattern that had been cemented through
logic and religious ritual, for hundreds of years.
B.

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
After the Civil War, states enacted Jim Crow laws to maintain
white supremacy in the wake of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments outlawing slavery and requiring equal protection of the
190. See An Exhortation to Obedience, supra note 107. As the first Roman
Catholic to serve on the Supreme Court, Justice Taney would have been familiar
with The Great Chain of Being; the concept appears in Catholic teachings on
hierarchy and order. See, e.g., Thomas Hurley, The Importance of the Hierarchy
in the Church, CATH. CULTURE (last visited Nov. 10, 2019),
https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?recnum=6694.
191. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
192. Id. at 3.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 11.
196. See J. Daniel Hays, A Biblical Perspective on Interracial Marriage, 2009
CRISWELL THEOLOGICAL REV. 5, 6–7 (2009), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1100
/d60152fa9586c5ea45b865df8c0d2584b078.pdf (explaining that many Southern
evangelicals still oppose interracial marriage).
197. See supra notes 107–08 and surrounding text.
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law.198 Separate but equal evolved as the accepted legal doctrine for
racial control. In 1896, Plessy v. Ferguson199 upheld an 1890
Louisiana law that required separate but equally appointed rail cars
for black and white passengers. The law criminalized persons who
occupied an incorrect rail car “on account of the race that they belong
to.”200 Justice Henry Billings Brown, whom historians have referred
to as one of the Supreme Court’s “dimmer lights,”201 upheld the law
because mere legal (as opposed to political) distinctions did not offend
the Fourteenth Amendment and because reasonable state laws
trumped federal conceptions of equality where interstate commerce
was not involved.202 Justice Brown opined that these legal categories
were ineluctable, the natural order of things; they “must always exist
so long as white men are distinguished from the other race by
color.”203 Further, in deciding that this Louisiana white supremacist
statute was a reasonable one, Justice Brown conflated order with
reasonableness:
[A state] is at liberty to act with reference to the established
usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view
to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the
public peace and good order.204

This part of the Plessy opinion illustrates how the reasonable man
came to fetishize legal categories, themselves derived from
cognitive/mental categories, which subsequently, by operation of law,
reproduced inequality through the physical and visual means of
spatial segregation.
The strict father mentality emerged when Justice Brown faulted
the plaintiff for arguing that the separate but equal law placed a
badge of inferiority on persons of color.205 That construction, Brown
remarked, was not founded upon “anything in the act,” but “solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”206
In this moment, Justice Brown acted as the strict father,
admonishing all people of color for choosing such an illogical
construction for separate but equal laws. Nothing was further from
the truth, however. “Everyone knew the assumption [that the
separate car was not inferior] was false . . . [t]he Jim Crow car was
198. See Louis Menand, The Supreme Court Case That Enshrined White
Supremacy in Law, NEW YORKER (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com
/magazine/2019/02/04/the-supreme-court-case-that-enshrined-white-supremacyin-law.
199. 163 U.S. 537, 553 (1896).
200. Id. at 540.
201. Menand, supra note 198.
202. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 545–48.
203. Id. at 543.
204. Id. at 550 (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 551.
206. Id.
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sometimes called “the dirt car.”207 By wholly ignoring the lived
experiences of everyone who encountered these types of laws, Justice
Brown gaslighted the other side.208 In a dissociative break from
reality, Justice Brown applied a psychotic form of legal formalism
that refused to register anything beyond the law’s text.209 And yet,
until Brown v. Board of Education,210 Plessy’s precedent setting
conclusions enabled white supremacist lawmakers to continue Jim
Crow with impunity.
C.

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)
The law as disciplinarian father became literal and material
when the Commonwealth of Virginia forcefully sterilized eighteenyear-old Carrie Buck. Decided in 1927, at the height of the eugenics
movement in the United States, the Supreme Court approved the
outcome.
In this notorious opinion, Oliver Wendell Holmes
introduces Carrie Buck as the daughter of a “feeble-minded” woman
who had herself given birth to a feeble-minded child.211 Because such
people “sap the strength of the State,” the State had the authority to
cut the fallopian tubes of women who are “manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind.”212 Justice Holmes concluded with a terse
aphorism, “Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”213
The case facts imply that the real concern about Carrie Buck was
not her mental deficiency, but the perception that she was socially
and sexually deviant.214 One of several illegitimate children, Carrie
Buck grew up in foster care. 215 After she was raped by her foster
parents’ nephew and became pregnant, she was deposited in
Virginia’s State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded.216 Mr.
Harry Laughlin, superintendent of the Carnegie Institute’s Eugenics
Record Office in Cold Spring Harbor, New York, provided written
207. Menand, supra note 198.
208. Gaslighting refers to psychological manipulation in which someone is led
to doubt their own sanity. Gaslight, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition
/gaslight. The term derives from a 1938 play (and later a 1944 movie starring
Ingrid Bergman) in which a murderous husband continuously dims the gas lights
in a home, and then tells his wife that she is imagining the changes in
illumination. See Sarah DiGiulio, What is Gaslighting? And How Do You Know
if it’s Happening to You?, NBC NEWS (July 13, 2018, 7:19 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/better/health/what-gaslighting-how-do-you-know-ifit-s-happening-ncna890866.
209. Menand, supra note 198.
210. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Menand, supra note 198 (explaining how
the Supreme Court overturned the Plessy decision in Brown v. Board of
Education).
211. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927).
212. Id. at 207.
213. Id.
214. Stephen J. Gould, Carrie Buck’s Daughter, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 331, 336
(1985).
215. Id.
216. Id.
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testimony in the case.217 Laughlin opined that Carrie Buck and her
mother earned low scores on the Stanford-Binet test of IQ, which was
sufficient evidence to place them both in the imbecile category, a class
of person who should not be allowed to further reproduce.218 Of the
Bucks, Mr. Laughlin wrote, “These people belong to the shiftless,
ignorant and worthless class of anti-social whites of the South.”219
Testimony about Carrie Buck’s infant daughter, Vivian, was the
final straw that pushed the Buck family into the category of unworthy
people who must not be allowed to reproduce.220 A social worker
testified that that Vivian, at six months old, had “a look about that is
not quite normal, but just what it is, I can’t tell.”221 And with that
quality of testimony, Carrie Buck’s daughter was declared to be the
third generation of an unfit hereditary line. Before Vivian died of
enteric colitis, likely related to childhood poverty, her elementary
school report cards indicated that she was a decent student; she was
on the honor roll for one term.222 She was certainly not an imbecile.223
If the reasonable man has a creator in the United States, that
creator is Oliver Wendell Holmes.224 Holmes is widely viewed as the
legal mind who brought the reasonable man to life.225 In this case,
Justice Holmes imposed judgment on Carrie Buck for “being poor and
pregnant” and did so “in a disguise of scientific authority.”226 The
decision to sterilize Carrie Buck was reasonable, required in order to
control defective members of the population.227 Justice Holmes is
literally the strict father who corporally punishes the child for
deviance, but in this case, the punishment was permanent, invasive,
and wholly unnecessary.
In another sense, this case surfaces the Christian trope that evil
must be permanently banished and totally excluded, which allows
goodness to perpetuate in an everlasting form.228 Holmes’ decision
also carries religious overtones. Stephen Jay Gould begins his essay
on the Buck v. Bell case with a quote from the Ten Commandments:
“For I, the Lord thy God, am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the
fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of
them that hate me.”229 Because “bad things come in threes,” the
presence of a feeble-minded child in the third generation was

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

ROBERTS, supra note 80, at 39–41.
Gould, supra note 214, at 334–36.
ROBERTS, supra note 80, at 40; Gould, supra note 214, at 336–37.
Gould, supra note 214, at 337.
Id.
Id. at 338.
Id.
See supra note 5.
Id.
ROBERTS, supra note 80, at 41.
Id. at 39.
ALAN WATTS, THE TWO HANDS OF GOD: MYTHS OF POLARITY 16 (1963).
Gould, supra note 214, at 331 (quoting Exodus 20:5 (King James)).
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sufficient to condemn the entire line.230 Following this reasoning, the
State, as father/God figure, can and must curtail unruly subjects by
terminating their ability to reproduce. From a different angle, this
case continues the patterns we’ve seen in Dred Scott and Plessy v.
Ferguson. Like these previous cases, Buck v. Bell indicates the
reasonable man’s compulsive desire for order and control. And, it
shows how the reasonable man fulfilled this compulsion through state
sanctioned coercion, animated by enduring folk and religious
tradition, but couched in the progressive rhetoric of science and
progress.
D.

Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)

This opinion is included in the reasonable man’s case history
because it shows discomfort with fluid categories that challenge
traditional notions of fatherhood and parenthood. In this case,
plaintiff Michael H. filed suit to establish parental rights over a child
he conceived while having an affair with a woman married to another
man, Gerald D.231 California Evidence Code Section 621 did not
provide Michael H., as biological father, with an avenue to establish
paternity.232 The statute presumed the child to be the child of the
married husband, unless the mother or husband challenged the
presumption within two years of the child’s birth.233 The Supreme
Court was called upon to decide if the statutory presumption
impermissibly interfered with the Michael H.’s procedural and
substantive due process right to establish a relationship with his
child; the child’s mother’s right to establish a filial relationship with
both men; and the child’s right to establish legitimacy with her
biological father.234
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia first decided that Michael
H.’s procedural due process claim lacked merit because the California
statute furthered its purpose, which was to protect the sanctity of the
family unit.235 Justice Scalia then decided that Michael H.’s
substantive due process rights were not violated because adulterous
fathers did not have a fundamental right to establish a relationship
with their children and the California statute was reasonably related
to its purpose, which was to protect the sanctity of the marital
relationship.236 The Court also rejected the due process theory that

230. Id.
231. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113–18 (1989).
232. Id. at 115.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 113, 118. The case also presented an issue of the child’s
constitutional right to maintain a relationship with her biological father. See id.
at 113.
235. Id. at 119–21.
236. Id. at 121–32.
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the mother and child had a right to define their family
relationships.237
Effectively, the Court protected the wishes of the married man,
the husband, at the expense of all other stakeholders in the family.
Further, Justice Scalia’s disciplinarian and judgmental tone was
quite apparent in his use of the adulterous label for the plaintiff.238
In writing about this case in their book Minding the Law,
Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner explained that “[t]he world
of Justice Scalia’s opinion is elementally designed so as to preserve
his orderly and hard-edged rules against the messy little facts that
might disorder them.”239 This diagnosis stemmed from Justice
Scalia’s difficulty in recognizing that two things can be true at the
same time.
Justice Scalia insisted that because nature had
constructed the category of human family very narrowly, there was
no room for two individuals to be a father.240 Bruner and Amsterdam
noted that Justice Scalia’s analysis “perpetuate[d] a basic symbol of
established hegemonies—political and religious, as well as social and
sexual—by consecrating a patriarchal notion of the family that
simultaneously excludes outsiders and rank-orders insiders in proper
top-down fashion.”241 Traditional patriarchy was instantiated by
excluding the mother, the child, and the biological father from having
a say in defining the contours of their family.242 Only the married
husband had a voice.
In addition to protecting and reinforcing traditional gender
power dynamics, a winner-take-all rhetoric propelled Justice Scalia’s
reasoning. In Justice Scalia’s view, Gerald D. would lose something
if Michael H. was granted any kind of right to see his child.243 The
winner (the man who is married) should be rewarded and the loser,
should lose. Competition is a good thing. 244 This case illustrates that
crowning one winner after a contest of power is the reasonable man’s
favorite form of dispute resolution.245
E. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F.
Supp. 182 (1991)
This case is a 1991 copyright infringement case involving hip hop
artist Biz Markie’s use of a sample from 1970s soft rock artist Gilbert
237. Id. at 130–32.
238. Id. at 130.
239. ANTHONY AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 105 (2000).
240. “California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual
fatherhood.” Michael H., 491 U.S. at 118.
241. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 239, at 82–83.
242. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130–31.
243. Id. at 130; AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 239, at 95, 100.
244. See NIALL FERGUSON, CIVILIZATION: THE WEST AND THE REST 306 (2011)
(extolling the virtues of Western style competition).
245. See, e.g., supra note 78 (As a social Darwinist, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, who incubated the reasonable man, believed that might made right).
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O’Sullivan. I have included this case in the reasonable man’s case
history because it exemplifies the reasonable man’s continuing
pattern of punishment and discipline on individuals who pursue nontraditional forms of knowledge production in a novel and ironic way.
Gilbert O’Sullivan was a mousy Canadian singer-songwriter who
penned a maudlin radio hit in the 1970s—“Alone Again
(Naturally).”246 Biz Markie was, and still is, a self-deprecating hip
hop artist who sampled O’Sullivan’s song in his song, “Alone Again,”
on his 1991 album, I Need A Haircut.247 In the song, Biz Markie
bemoans his poor luck with romance and uses the O’Sullivan sample
as a witty reference point.248 In response, Gilbert O’Sullivan’s
publisher sued for copyright infringement.249
Federal District Court Judge Kevin Duffy began his opinion with
a biblical reference: “Thou shalt not steal.”250 He then quickly
dispensed with any defense Biz Markie may have had that would
have challenged O’Sullivan’s suit.251 There was absolutely no
consideration that Biz Markie’s use of samples on his album was a
novel and transformative use of the material that fell into the “fair
use” exception for copyright infringement.252 If one listens to the
song, it is obvious that Biz Markie is doing something very different
with O’Sullivan’s material, so much so that the market for Sullivan’s
song would not have been disturbed.253 Instead, the judicial opinion
opens with a biblical command and concludes with a call for
punishment. Judge Duffy opined that Biz Markie and his record label
required “sterner measures” as a form of punishment.254 To that end,
Judge Duffy referred the case to the United States Attorney for
possible criminal copyright prosecution.255 This case illustrates the
reasonable man’s religiously based desire to punish and discipline, as
well as his inability to understand alternative frameworks that derive
from outside of his rigidly limited world.

246. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp.
182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
247. Biz Markie, Alone Again, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=OebqNsNRBtU (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
248. See id.
249. Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 183.
250. Id. (citing Exodus 20:15).
251. Id.
252. It is not clear that Biz Markie’s lawyers pled this defense. In any event,
in 1991, the fair use doctrine had not yet evolved to recognize the value of
transformative and parodic elements of copying. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579–80 (1994).
253. See id. at 590–93 (where use of copyrighted material does not appreciably
impact the market for the original material, that factor weighs in favor of the fair
use defense).
254. Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 185.
255. Id.
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VI. THE REASONABLE MAN MIGHT BE MENTALLY ILL
This case study has demonstrated that the reasonable man, as a
construct for law and legal reasoning, is discomforted by unruly
persons and things that do not fit neatly into the boxes that he knows.
Through thick and unbending boundaries, the reasonable man is
compelled to keep order. The reasonable man’s fixation on categories
results, in part, from his cultural and religious upbringing. His
rigidity and need for control might also be borne out of an excessive
fear of risk and uncertainty.
The above symptoms are, in fact, indicative of ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder.256
OCD “is characterized as a chronic
maladaptive pattern of excessive perfectionism, preoccupation with
orderliness and detail, and need for control over one’s environment
that leads to significant distress or impairment.”257 Those with OCD
have intense and uncontrollable feelings such as “fear, disgust, doubt,
or a feeling that things have to be done in a way that is ‘just right.’”258
The OCD sufferer is compelled to engage in ritualistic behaviors to
quell his/her extreme feelings of fear and anxiety.259 Individuals
suffering from OCD often exhibit a maladaptive need for order and
symmetry.260 The need for control over one’s environment, the
preoccupation with order and symmetry, and the desire to snuff out
anxious feelings accurately describe some aspects of the reasonable
man’s ethos:
•

Descendants of slaves cannot be citizens because that
would lead to impermissible commingling;261

•

Racial separatism accomplished through separate but
equal conditions is a reasonable law, a good law;262

•

Unruly “defective” people should be forcefully sterilized
because the genetic line must be cleaned up;263
Two men cannot both be fathers–there can only be one,
especially if one man is adulterous;264

•

256. See Nicole M. Cain et al., Interpersonal Functioning in ObsessiveCompulsive Personality Disorder, 97 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 90, 90 (2015).
257. Id.
258. What is OCD?, INT’L OCD FOUND., https://iocdf.org/about-ocd/.
259. “Girls” Lena Dunham Gets It Right, INT’L OCD FOUND., https://iocdf.org
/blog/2013/03/07/girls-lena-dunham-gets-it-right/ (explaining that an episode of
Girls accurately depicts the symptoms of OCD).
260. Kristy L. Dykshoorn, Trauma-Related Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, 2
HEALTHY PSYCHOL. & BEHAV. MED. 517, 518 (2014), https://www.tandfonline.com
/doi/pdf/10.1080/21642850.2014.905207?needAccess=true.
261. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 408–09, 415 (1856).
262. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543, 545–48, 550 (1896).
263. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
264. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119–32 (1989).
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Novel art forms that re-appropriate prior material are
sinful and must be punished.265

Persons with OCD believe they must perform rituals in order to
avoid a dreaded harm.266 The reasonable man’s slavish legal
formalism could be viewed as a legal process that is imbued with
ritual. The reasonable man’s adherence to rigid categories can be
considered symptomatic of OCD because his thinking is animated by
religious fervor and a dreaded harm, in this case, fear of disorder and
social/racial upheaval.
The reasonable man’s deep desire to punish others who
transgress category boundaries, through intrusive state-sanctioned
violence or prosecution, is also not mentally healthy. The reasonable
man’s fixation on strict discipline connects with the clinical fact that
persons with OCD have been observed to adhere to a highly rigid code
of morality.267 The desire to punish can also be explained as a coping
mechanism. Hostile punishment of others could reduce the distress
that comes from feeling a loss of control.268
Persons with OCD exercise strict thought control over their own
thoughts.269 On this point, the reasonable man’s rigidly linear
thoughts can be viewed as a product of a strictly controlled
consciousness. As a construct for the law, the reasonable man exerts
strict thought control on the law—illustrated by his intransigent
refusal to look outside the text of a statute, for instance.270
Finally, an excessive desire for symmetry is a symptom of
OCD.271 As applied to the reasonable man, this symptom might
surface as a fetishization of artificial dichotomies, an inability to
understand that a concept can exist in more than one modality, that
two persons can hold the position of father, for instance.272

265. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp.
182, 183–85 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
266. See Do ‘Neat Freaks’ Have OCD?, EVERYDAY HEALTH (Jan. 10, 2014),
https://www.everydayhealth.com/anxiety-disorders/experts-do-neat-freaks-haveocd.aspx.
267. Alexis E. Whitton, Julie D. Henry & Jessica R. Grisham, Moral Rigidity
in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder: Do Abnormalities in Inhibitory Control,
Cognitive Flexibility and Disgust Play a Role?, 45 J. BEHAV. THERAPY &
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY 152, 152 (2014).
268. See Cain, supra note 256, at 90, 95 (reporting that individuals with OCD
suffer from hostile interpersonal relationships).
269. Orna Reuven-Magril, Reuven Dar & Nira Liberman, Illusion of Control
and Behavioral Control Attempts in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, 117 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 334, 334 (2008).
270. See supra notes 208–09 and surrounding text.
271. Laura J. Summerfeldt, Shaun J. Gilbert & Michael Reynolds,
Incompleteness, Aesthetic Sensitivity, and the Obsessive-Compulsive Need for
Symmetry, 49 J. BEHAV. THERAPY & EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY 141, 141–42
(2015).
272. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989).
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This discussion of OCD has applied clinical information to the
reasonable man, a legal fiction. OCD, however, is a real disease that
causes real pain and suffering. Some of my thoughts on this topic, I
admit, have derived from how OCD has been depicted in popular
culture. Most notably, I think of the reasonable man’s OCD as being
similar to the symptoms of Adrian Monk, the eponymous detective on
the television show Monk.273 In conducting the research for this
Article, I have learned that popular culture minimizes some aspects
of OCD for the sake of entertainment. Popular culture does not show
the “terror and despair and shame and self-loathing that many OCD
sufferers endure.”274 Persons suffering from OCD often suffer from a
“soul-crushing existential dread.”275 On this point, there is a
connection between the acute suffering that OCD sufferers
experience and the pain and suffering that many, many lawyers and
law students suffer—e.g., statistically higher levels of depression,
substance and drug abuse, and family issues.276 Healing the
reasonable man is not just a cute gimmick for a law review article.
Healing the reasonable man would hopefully mean we are able to
create antidotes for law’s toxicity.
VII. CONCLUSION: CAN WE HEAL THE REASONABLE MAN?
The religious and cultural narratives discussed in the first Part
of this Article have been fused into the law and into the consciousness
of the collective legal mind.277 This is particularly true of the
religiously based punitive father/judge archetype, which undergirds
the reasonable man’s ethos. The punitive father/judge archetype has
produced a hyper-competitive legal culture that forces actors to
operate in a field of unforgiving dualism. You either win or you lose,
you are guilty or not guilty, you are in the top ten percent of your class
(and therefore a good law student) or you are mediocre. By virtue of
the power of his state sanctioned legal language, the reasonable
man’s binary and categorical approach to legal process reinforces and
reproduces legal culture.
As this Article has shown, the reasonable man’s need to impose
order and control has, at times, obstructed the growth of justice,
fairness, and equality. Nonetheless, the reasonable man’s reason,
which most agree is a good thing, remains the majoritarian method
273. Monk (Mandeville Films and Touchstone Television 2002–2009).
274. Fletcher Wortmann, Why “Monk” Stunk, PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 16,
2013),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/triggered/201305/why-monkstunk.
275. Id.
276. See Austin, Positive Legal Education, supra note 29, at 654.
277. See WATTS, supra note 228, at 13. Watts borrows Carl Jung’s archetype
theory to explore how myths and images, “which millions of years of living have
stored up and condensed into organic material” have formed part of the collective
unconscious but which have also (and this departs from Jung’s theory) become
interwoven with the social matrix of humankind. See id.
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of legal process. While the reasonable man’s legal process has oftentimes produced good and fair results, if left unchecked, the reasonable
man can become a golem who wreaks havoc in the ontological
landscape of law.
So, when the reasonable man is exhibiting symptoms of OCD or
some other personality disorder, can we heal him? Alternative legal
processes that depart from classic adversarial dualism are part of the
solution. Therapeutic justice, 278 alternative dispute resolution,279
and participatory defense movements280 have brought us some of
these approaches already. All of these movements, in some way,
depart from the combative aspects of legal process and approach legal
problem-solving in a community centered way.
Another potential intervention for the reasonable man is dialectic
behavioral therapy. We might encourage legal actors—judges and
lawyers—as part of the legal process, to engage in dialectic behavioral
therapy. Dialectic behavioral therapy seeks to curtain the harm that
comes from toxic either/or thinking by having subjects concentrate on
holding two opposing ideas in the mind at the same time.281 For the
most part, the reasonable man’s polarized approach to reason
eschews this way of knowing. In criminal law, actively engaging with
the idea that a defendant can be adjudicated guilty yet be actually
innocent at the same time could be helpful to judges and members of
juries in criminal trials. Today’s steady drumbeat of exonerations
achieved through DNA and fingerprint evidence demonstrates the

278. See David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Justice, 57 MINN. L. REV. 289, 290–92
(Therapeutic justice rejects classical criminal theories of punishment,
retribution, and deterrence and instead strives to treat the criminal offender
humanely, sometimes outside of formal legal systems, in order to treat and heal
the person); see also Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventative Law and
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Law and Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering,
34 CAL. W. L. REV. 15, 17–18 (1997–1998).
279. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal
Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 763–64
(1984) (A problem-solving approach to dispute resolution “promotes and
maximizes human interactions that are creative, enfranchising, enriching and
empowering,” whereas an adversarial approach to disputes is often “alienating
and conflict-provoking.”).
280. See Janet Moore, Marla Sandys & Raj Jayadev, Make Them Hear You:
Participatory Defense and the Struggle for Criminal Justice Reform, 78 ALB. L.
REV. 1281, 1281–82 (2015) (Participatory defense is a community centered
movement that transforms people facing criminal charges and their families from
passive recipients of legal services to change agents who provide mutual support
and check the spread of mass incarceration).
281. Dialectic
Behavioral
Therapy,
PSYCHOL.
TODAY,
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/therapy-types/dialectical-behavior-therapy
(last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
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need for such a practice.282 It could help slow down the impulse to
convict based on confirmation bias and implicit racial bias.283
Another strategy for healing the reasonable man is to infuse him
with nuance and context and reject the principle that what is
reasonable is not a uniform standard that descends from a cold
Olympian vantage point.284 Commonwealth v. Warren,285 a recent
Massachusetts Supreme Court case, illustrates a better, less tonedeaf approach to the reasonableness construct. In evaluating
whether a black man’s choice to flee created reasonable suspicion in
the mind of the police officer (which would have authorized the
investigatory stop), the court considered a recent study indicating
that “black men in the city of Boston were more likely to be targeted
for police-civilian encounters.”286 In performing the reasonable
suspicion analysis the Massachusetts Supreme Court looked not only
to the police officer’s perspective, but also to longstanding racial
context of police/civilian relations in Boston:
[T]he finding that black males in Boston are disproportionately
and repeatedly targeted for FIO encounters suggests a reason
for flight totally unrelated to consciousness of guilt. Such an
individual, when approached by the police, might just as easily
motivated by the desire to avoid the recurring indignity of being
racially profiled as by the desire to hide criminal activity. Given
this reality for black males in the city of Boston, a judge should,
in appropriate cases, consider the report’s findings in weighing
flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus.287

In the tradition of the Brandeis Brief,288 a social science lens enabled
the court to see both majoritarian (white) conceptions of policecivilian encounters but also the lived experiences of policed persons
of color. Boston’s documented history of racial profiling gave rise to a
282. See, e.g., Innocence Staff, Match in National Fingerprint Database
Establishes Innocence of Baton Rouge Man After 36 Years in Prison, INNOCENCE
PROJECT (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.innocenceproject.org/fingerprint-databasematch-establishes-archie-williams-innocence/.
283. See, e.g., Race and Wrongful Convictions, INNOCENCE PROJECT (June 24,
2010), https://www.innocenceproject.org/race-and-wrongful-convictions/.
284. See HORWITZ, supra note 121, at 271 (explaining that the formalist
impulse, in this case, the mid-century search for “neutral principles” indicated a
“persistent yearning to find an Olympian position from which to objectively
cushion the terrors of social choice.”).
285. 58 N.E.3d 333, 342 (Mass. 2016).
286. Id. (citing Boston Police Commissioner Announces Field Interrogation
and Observation (FIO) Study Results, BOSTON POLICE DEP’T (Oct. 8, 2014),
https://perma.cc/H9RJ-RHNB.
287. Id.
288. The Brandeis Brief refers to an appellate brief that extensively cites
social-science evidence for context and policy perspective. It refers to the brief
that Louis Brandeis authored and filed in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
See Alan B. Morrison, The Brandeis Brief and 21st Century Constitutional
Litigation, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L.J. 715, 715 (2014).
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logical inference that running from the police is not suspicious, but,
in actuality, eminently reasonable.
Finally, as I have argued previously,289 studying legal rhetoric in
a comparative context is also a form of therapy we can give the
reasonable man. As critical rhetoric scholar Teri McMurtry-Chubb
has compellingly written, looking beyond Western ways of knowing
can help us move beyond the limits of our current broken legal
system, and reach a point of healing and inclusion.290 New critical
scholarship on this topic has the potential to remodel our legal
system, enriching it with a healthy infusion of alternative ways of
doing law and knowing law. The truly transformative potential for
law is to have it look beyond linear and individualistic reasoning and
instead visualize legal remedies that might permanently heal those
who have been injured by continuing patterns of violence, oppression,
and disenfranchisement. The reasonable man should go back to
school to acquire a critical knowledge base. The reasonable man
would enter school as a neophyte and exit his training as a different
kind of person—a critical, empathetic, and bias-aware person. The
reasonable man would become reasonably woke.291

289. See Jewel, supra note 36, at 691–95.
290. McMurtry-Chubb, supra note 141, at 909.
291. Woke, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/woke (defining “woke” to mean being “aware of and actively attentive to
important facts and issues (especially issues of racial and social justice)”).
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